All-repository write

Techniques it enables

• Delete branches and workflow runs Delete code or cover tracks · through Actions: Write, Contents: Write
• Trigger the publish workflow from a tampered branch Poison the build or published package · through Actions: Write, Contents: Write
• Publish a malicious version with a stolen token Poison the build or published package · through Packages: Write
• Have a workflow approve the PR Submit malicious code · through Workflows: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Add a workflow that dumps secrets Steal CI secrets and tokens · through Workflows: Write
• Leave a dormant workflow behind Keep access · through Workflows: Write
• Push directly, without review Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write
• Push more commits after approval Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Approve someone else's PR, then push to it Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Hide it in a change nobody can review Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write
• Use a trusted colleague's account Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Force push or delete a protected branch Delete code or cover tracks · through Contents: Write
• Push a release tag to an unreviewed commit Point a release tag at a bad commit · through Contents: Write
• Repoint existing tags on a published Action Point a release tag at a bad commit · through Contents: Write
• Run PR code in a privileged workflow Steal CI secrets and tokens · through Contents: Write
• Read secrets from the runner Steal CI secrets and tokens · through Contents: Write
• Get an agent to copy private code into public Read or expose private code · through Issues: Write, Contents: Read
• Approve your own PR from a second account Submit malicious code · through Pull requests: Write
• Trick or outlast the reviewer Submit malicious code · through Pull requests: Write
• Clone private repos with a stolen token Read or expose private code · through Contents: Read

Escalations it starts

• Start a privileged publish job by hand: Whatever the publish job holds: package registry tokens and the right to publish. · through Actions: Write
• Change a workflow, get its secrets: Every secret the repository's workflows can read, and cloud access through OIDC. · through Workflows: Write
• Move release tags on a widely used Action: Code execution, with their secrets, in every repository that pins the Action by tag. · through Contents: Write
• Change a shared reusable workflow: Code running in every calling repository's workflow, with the secrets and GITHUB_TOKEN those runs get: an internal version of a compromised Action. · through Contents: Write

Abused in