Owner

Techniques it enables

• Add a guest collaborator or new app Keep access · through Members: Write (org), Administration: Write, GitHub App installation repository access: Write
• Bypass or switch off the rules Submit malicious code · through Administration: Write (org), Administration: Write
• Flip private repos to public Read or expose private code · through Administration: Write (org), Administration: Write
• Delete branches and workflow runs Delete code or cover tracks · through Actions: Write, Contents: Write
• Trigger the publish workflow from a tampered branch Poison the build or published package · through Actions: Write, Contents: Write
• Approve your own PR from a second account Submit malicious code · through Administration: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Force push or delete a protected branch Delete code or cover tracks · through Administration: Write, Contents: Write
• Register the attacker's machine as a runner Keep access · through Administration: Write, Self-hosted runners: Write (org)
• Publish a malicious version with a stolen token Poison the build or published package · through Packages: Write
• Have a workflow approve the PR Submit malicious code · through Workflows: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Add a workflow that dumps secrets Steal CI secrets and tokens · through Workflows: Write
• Leave a dormant workflow behind Keep access · through Workflows: Write
• Push directly, without review Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write
• Push more commits after approval Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Approve someone else's PR, then push to it Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Hide it in a change nobody can review Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write
• Use a trusted colleague's account Submit malicious code · through Contents: Write, Pull requests: Write
• Push a release tag to an unreviewed commit Point a release tag at a bad commit · through Contents: Write
• Repoint existing tags on a published Action Point a release tag at a bad commit · through Contents: Write
• Run PR code in a privileged workflow Steal CI secrets and tokens · through Contents: Write
• Read secrets from the runner Steal CI secrets and tokens · through Contents: Write
• Get an agent to copy private code into public Read or expose private code · through Issues: Write, Contents: Read
• Trick or outlast the reviewer Submit malicious code · through Pull requests: Write
• Clone private repos with a stolen token Read or expose private code · through Contents: Read

Escalations it starts

• Add a collaborator or guest that outlives the attack: Access that survives password resets and token revocation. · through Members: Write (org), Administration: Write
• Flip private repositories to public: Private source code exposed to everyone. · through Administration: Write (org), Administration: Write
• Start a privileged publish job by hand: Whatever the publish job holds: package registry tokens and the right to publish. · through Actions: Write
• Register a self-hosted runner: Every job routed to that runner, with the secrets those jobs receive, and a foothold that outlives the stolen token. · through Administration: Write, Self-hosted runners: Write (org)
• Harvest leaked secrets from scanning alerts: Live credentials found in code and history: cloud keys, tokens and passwords, often for systems outside GitHub. · through Secret scanning alerts: Read
• Change a workflow, get its secrets: Every secret the repository's workflows can read, and cloud access through OIDC. · through Workflows: Write
• Move release tags on a widely used Action: Code execution, with their secrets, in every repository that pins the Action by tag. · through Contents: Write
• Change a shared reusable workflow: Code running in every calling repository's workflow, with the secrets and GITHUB_TOKEN those runs get: an internal version of a compromised Action. · through Contents: Write

Abused in