Repository role·One repository

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Tier 3 · LowData

Why Tier 3

Tier 3 because nothing it includes goes beyond Tier 3.

View and discuss the project.

Available on: Every setup. Source

Permissions it includes (9)

Tier	Permission	From
T3sets tier	Actions: Readrepository	View GitHub Actions workflow runs documented
T3sets tier	Administration: Readrepository	View rulesets for a repository documented
T3sets tier	Codespaces: Writerepository In part, counts as T3 (the full permission is T2): A codespace with the person's own access and no repository secrets.	Create codespaces for private repositories Create codespaces for public repositories inferred
T3sets tier	Contents: Readrepository	Pull from the person or team's assigned repositories Fork the person or team's assigned repositories View published releases documented
T3sets tier	Discussions: Writerepository In part, counts as T3 (the full permission is T2): Posting, not moderating.	Create new discussions and comment on existing discussions inferred
T3sets tier	Issues: Writerepository In part, counts as T3 (the full permission is T2): Opening and commenting on issues, not editing anyone else's.	Open issues Close issues they opened themselves Reopen issues they closed themselves inferred
T3sets tier	Packages: Readrepository	View and install packages documented
T3sets tier	Pull requests: Writerepository In part, counts as T3 (the full permission is T2): Proposes changes; nothing lands without someone with write access.	Send pull requests from forks of the team's assigned repositories Submit reviews on pull requests inferred
T3sets tier	Code scanning alerts: Readrepository	View code scanning alerts on pull requests documented

Attack paths

Techniques it enables

Clone private repos with a stolen token Read or expose private code · through Contents: Read
Get an agent to copy private code into public Read or expose private code · through Contents: Read

Abused in

ArtiPACKED artifact token leakage GitHub's internal repositories taken through a VS Code extension Shai-Hulud self-propagating worm (1.0 & 2.0)GitHub MCP / agentic token breadth OAuth consent phishing at scale Mercedes-Benz source code exposure Heroku / Travis CI OAuth token theft

Abilities with no matching permission

These do not affect the tier.

Edit and delete their own comments (Only the person's own comments.)
Have an issue assigned to them (Being assigned grants nothing.)
Edit wikis in public repositories (Wikis have no API permission. Wiki edits do not change code or settings.)
Report abusive or spammy content (Moderation report only.)

GitHub Docs for this role